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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Courts addressed several is-
sues in the area of commercial law. The cases discussed in this
Article involve topics from the following areas: banks and bank-
ing,' corporations2 and contracts.' Additionally, this Article will
highlight important legislative changes to the Illinois Banking
Act,4 the Foreign Banking Office Act' and the Illinois Securities
Law of 1955.6
II. BANKS AND BANKING
The Illinois Supreme Court decided three cases involving banks
and banking during the Survey year. In two cases, the court ad-
dressed issues arising under the Uniform Commercial Code.7 In
the third case, the court reviewed and declared unconstitutional
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Ilana D. Rovner, United States District Judge, North-
ern District of Illinois; J.D., 1986, Stanford University.
** B.A., 1988, Lawrence University; J.D. candidate, 1991, Loyola University of
Chicago.
I. See infra notes 7-106 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 107-142 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 143-180 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 9-75 and accompanying text.
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section 3 of Illinois' Foreign Office Banking Act.'
In National Bank of Monticello v. Quinn,9 the Supreme Court of
Illinois outlined the duties owed by a drawee bank to its customer
in determining whether a check is "properly payable,"' 0 under Illi-
nois' codification of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") sec-
tjon 4-40 1.1 The court held a drawee bank liable for charging
against a drawer's account a check made "payable to order"'12 that
had been endorsed in a manner that failed to indicate the named
payee. I3
The appellant, Quinn, issued a $30,000 check payable to Lime-
tree Beach Associates, Ltd. ("Limetree") to buy into an investment
partnership. 14 Quinn personally delivered the check to the individ-
ual forming the partnership, Dan L. Wey.'5 Wey endorsed the
check, in his individual capacity only, and deposited it into his per-
sonal business account rather than into the Limetree business ac-
count. 6 Both Limetree's account and Wey's personal business
accounts listed Wey as an authorized signatory.' 7 Additionally,
both accounts were at Marine American State Bank, formerly the
American State Bank of Bloomington ("American State").' s
Quinn made a demand upon National Bank of Monticello ("Na-
tional") to recredit his account for $30,000 on the grounds that the
check was not properly payable.' 9 National refused and brought
8. See infra notes 76-106 and accompanying text.
9. 126 Ill. 2d 129, 533 N.E.2d 846 (1989).
10. Monticello, 126 Ill. 2d at 134, 533 N.E.2d at 848.
11. Section 4-401 of the UCC provides that "[a]s against its customer, a bank may
charge against his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that ac-
count even though the charge creates an overdraft." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 4-
401(1) (1987).
12. The UCC explains that "[a] negotiable instrument is payable to order when by its
terms it is payable to the order or assigns of any person therein specified with reasonable
certainty, or to him or his order, or when it is conspicuously designated on its face as
'exchange' or the like and names a payee." See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 3-100(1)
(1987). The alternative to an instrument "payable to order" is an instrument "payable to
bearer" that "is payable to... bearer or the order of bearer; or... a specified person or
bearer; or... 'cash' or the order of 'cash', or any other indication which does not purport
to designate a specific payee .... Id. para. 3-111.
13. Monticello, 126 Ill. 2d at 139, 533 N.E.2d at 851.
14. Id. at 131, 533 N.E.2d at 847.
15. Id. at 131-32, 533 N.E.2d at 847. Wey was the sole individual general partner of
the Limetree Beach partnership. Id. at 132, 533 N.E.2d at 848.
16. Id. at 132, 533 N.E.2d at 847. The endorsement read "Deposit 049 580," the
number for Wey's personal business account. Id. There was no dispute as to the authen-
ticity of Wey's endorsement. Id. at 132, 533 N.E.2d at 847-48.
17. Id. at 132, 533 N.E.2d at 848.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 131, 533 N.E.2d at 847.
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an action for declaratory relief to determine whether it owed
Quinn a duty to recredit his account.2 0 Quinn initiated a counter-
claim against National, and National responded by filing a third-
party complaint against the depositary bank, American State.2 t
Quinn argued that because Wey's endorsement was unauthor-
ized, and the UCC equates an unauthorized signature with a
forged signature,22 National must recredit his account.23 Quinn of-
fered the Limetree partnership agreement and offering memoran-
dum as evidence to support his allegation that Wey lacked proper
authority.24
The trial court granted Quinn's motion for summary judgment
against National, ruling that Wey's endorsement was invalid be-
cause he exceeded his authority as set forth in various Limetree
partnership documents.2 ' The appellate court reversed, holding
that the check was "properly payable. 21 6 The court reasoned that
the signature card evidenced a contract between American State
and Wey and that Wey was the listed signatory on the signature
card on file .2  Thus, according to the appellate court, the trial
court erred by considering the extraneous partnership docu-
ments. 28 American State, and through it National, could rely on
the signature card to determine Wey's authority.29
In order to assess whether a check is "properly payable," the
Illinois Supreme Court examined the scope of the duty owed by a
drawee bank to its customer. 3o The court reiterated that the rela-
tionship between a drawer and a drawee is a contractual one. 31
20. Id. at 132, .533 N.E.2d at 848.
21. Id. at 132-33, 533 N.E.2d at 848. National sought an order requiring American
State to compensate National if the court ruled in Quinn's favor. Id.
22. Under UCC section 1-201(43) an "'[u]nauthorized' signature or endorsement
means one made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 1-201(43) (1987).
23. Monticello, 126 Ill. 2d at 134, 533 N.E.2d at 848-49.
24. Id. at 134, 533 N.E.2d at 849.
25. Id. at 133, 533 N.E.2d at 848. The trial court looked at the offering memoran-
dum for the limited partnership and the limited partnership agreement; it concluded that
Wey had exceeded his authority in making the endorsement and in depositing the check
payable to Limetree Beach, Ltd. into his personal business account. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. In the appellate court's view, the signature card was the sole evidence of the
contract between Wey and American State, and as long as payment was made in accord-
ance with the contract, National could not be liable. Id. The appellate court ruled that
summary judgment should have been granted to National. Id. at 131, 533 N.E.2d at 847.
30. Id. at 134, 533 N.E.2d at 848.
31. Id. at 134, 533 N.E.2d at 849.
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When a check is made payable to the order of a named payee, the
drawee bank has an absolute contractual duty to pay only to that
named payee or to the payee's order.32 In this case, the drawee
bank breached its duty to the drawer, Quinn, because it paid his
check to someone other than the payee, Limetree, or to Limetree's
order.33 Thus, even though Wey would have been the person to
deposit the check into the Limetree account, that Wey endorsed
the check and deposited it into his personal account was "fatal to
the bank's denial of liability. ' 34
In holding the endorsement invalid, the Illinois Supreme Court
relied on Cosmopolitan State Bank v. Lake Shore Trust & Savings
Bank 3 5 and Kosic v. Marine Midland Bank.a6 In Cosmopolitan, the
drawer, in order to purchase a car, delivered a check to an auto
dealer. The check was made payable to an auto supplier who
supposedly had possession of the particular car. 3s The dealer en-
dorsed the check and delivered neither the car nor the money. 9
Subsequently, the drawee bank recredited the drawer and sought
reimbursement from the collecting bank.1° The Cosmopolitan
court held for the drawee bank, relying on the testimony of the
automobile supply company manager, who said that he neither saw
the check nor gave the automobile dealer the authority to endorse
the check.41 The court stated that the drawee bank cannot settle
equities among various endorsers because "its only authority,
where the check is payable to the order of the payee, is to pay it on
such order according to its terms. "42
The Monticello court explained that the key question in Cosmo-
politan involved the type of information that either the drawer,
customer, or the drawee bank may rely on in support of a section
32. Id. at 135, 533 N.E.2d at 849 (citing United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central
Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 513, 175 N.E. 825, 829 (1931)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 139, 533 N.E.2d at 851.
35. 343 Ill. 347, 175 N.E. 583 (1931). The court noted that Cosmopolitan predated
Illinois' adoption of the UCC. Monticello, 126 Ill. 2d at 135, 533 N.E.2d at 849.
36. 76 A.D.2d 89, 430 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1980).
37. Monticello, 126 Ill. 2d at 136, 533 N.E.2d at 849.
38. Id. The drawer wanted a specific type of car so the dealer took the drawer di-
rectly to an automobile supplier to select a car. Id. at 135-36, 533 N.E.2d at 849. After-
wards, the dealer called the drawer and asked for payment on the car so that the dealer
could pick it up. Id. at 136, 533 N.E.2d at 849.
39. Id. The dealer endorsed the check in the automobile company's name and took
both the check's cash value and the automobile. Id.
40. Id. at 135, 533 N.E.2d at 849.
41. Id. at 136, 533 N.E.2d at 849-50.
42. Id. at 137, 533 N.E.2d at 850 (quoting Cosmopolitan, 343 Ill. at 352, 175 N.E. at
585).
[Vol. 21
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4-401(1) (not properly payable) claim. 3 The answer was implicit
in the Cosmopolitan court's reliance on parol evidence admitted by
the supply company's manager." Although the Monticello court
found that in Cosmopolitan the dealer's lack of authority to en-
dorse the check was obvious, it noted that in the present case,
Wey's position as sole general partner made the lack of authority
distinction less than "clear-cut. ' 45 The court asserted, however,
that a signature card alone is insufficient to establish a general part-
ner's authority to "deal with a check in any manner he so
chooses. "46
The court also relied on the Kosic case, in which a drawer made
two checks payable to the order of a corporation that he and a co-
venturer were forming.47 The co-venturer, however, endorsed the
checks in her own name and deposited them into her personal ac-
count, rather than the corporate account .4  The Kosic court held
for the drawer stating that "[b]ecause the two cashiers checks did
not bear the endorsement of the payee, [the drawee bank] breached
a duty owed to its customer in charging against his account items
that were not 'properly payable.' ",9
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Monticello broadly re-
affirms the principle set forth in UCC section 4-401(1) that a bank
must pay only checks that are properly payable.5 0 The court fo-
cused upon the manner in which Wey had endorsed the check."
Noting that Quinn had made the check payable to the partnership
rather than to Wey personally, the court reasoned that the drawee
bank had breached its duty to pay the check in compliance with
Quinn's instructions. 2 In this respect, Wey's authority to endorse
the check was irrelevant because the drawee bank, National, paid
43. 126 Ill. 2d at 136, 533 N.E.2d at 850.
44. Id. at 136-37, 533 N.E.2d at 850.
45. Id. at 136, 533 N.E.2d at 850.
46. Id. at 137, 533 N.E.2d at 850.
47. Monticello, 126 Ill. 2d at 138, 533 N.E.2d at 850. The checks were drawn accord-
ing to the terms of an escrow agreement that called for all funds to be placed in an escrow
account at Central Trust Company. Id.
48. Id. When the co-venturer received the checks, she opened both a personal sav-
ings account and a corporate checking account. Id. For the corporate checking account,
she signed a temporary signature card as president of the corporation, but she never
completed or returned the permanent signature cards or the corporate resolutions given
to her by the bank. Id. She deposited the drawer's checks into her personal account by
her personal endorsement. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Kosic, 76 A.D.2d at 91-92, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 177).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 4-401(1) (1987). For the text of section 4-401(1),
see supra note 11.
51. Monticello, 126 Ill. 2d at 137, 533 N.E.2d at 850.
52. Id. at 138-39, 533 N.E.2d at 851.
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the check with only Wey's personal endorsement. Thus, Monti-
cello merely highlights a bank's obligation to ensure that a check is
cashed according to its customer's instructions.
Because summary judgment at the trial court level was granted
in favor of Quinn against the drawee bank, National, the issue of
whether the depositary bank, American State, would have been
held liable for reimbursement to National was not decided. Thus,
this case did not address whether a depositary bank should ex-
amine the records of a partnership or corporate entity to determine
if the endorser has the authority to endorse the check. This ques-
tion of a depositary bank's duty will no doubt resurface in circum-
stances that do not render the customer's instructions dispositive.
In Monticello, it was a relatively simple task for the depository
bank to determine in which account Quinn's check should be de-
posited. One account was Wey's personal account, and the other
was the partnership account; the same bank held both. In cases
that present facts involving multiple partnership or corporate ac-
counts at multiple banks, determination of the proper account for
deposit will not be as simple. The courts may be forced to rely less
upon the customer's directions and more upon the endorser's au-
thority. Therefore, the supreme court may be called upon to deter-
mine whether and to what extent the depositary bank owes a duty
to examine the endorser's authority.
For the time being, however, Monticello demonstrates that
drawers ought to make their checks payable to order and to make
their directions for payment as specific as possible. To the extent
that the drawee bank can assess the endorsement's propriety from
the customer's instructions for payment, under Monticello, the
drawee bank will be liable for its failure to act in accordance with
those instructions.
In Spec-Cast, Inc. v. First National Bank & Trust Company,13 the
Illinois Supreme Court recognized a bank's ability to raise as com-
mon law defenses benefit of the bargain and ratification when it
pays an unsigned check in violation of UCC section 3-401(l)."4 On
February 9, 1983, Jackson, the president of Spec-Cast, Inc. ("Spec-
Cast"), gave Lundquist an unsigned corporate check for $20,000 as
a loan to help him through financial difficulties with his used-car
53. 128 I11. 2d 167, 538 N.E.2d 543 (1989).
54. Id. at 170, 538 N.E.2d at 543. UCC section 3-401(1) provides that "[n]o person is
liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26,
para. 3-401(1) (1987).
[V/ol. 21
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dealership, Richard's Auto Sales." Jackson did.not receive any
security for the loan because all of Lundquist's business assets were
subject to a lien.5 6 On the following day, however, Jackson ac-
cepted a $20,000 unsecured demand note in favor of Jackson and
Spec-Cast." The defendant, First National Bank & Trust Com-
pany of Rockford, paid the unsigned check on February 11, 1983.58
Jackson noted payment of the check in his checking account state-
ment of March, 1983 and subsequently undertook to recover his
money. 9 In May, 1983, Jackson accepted an interest payment on
the note for $589, but in March, 1984, when he made written de-
mand on Lundquist for payment, Lundquist was unable to de-
liver.' On June 1, 1984, Lundquist filed for bankruptcy and
Richard's Auto Sales went out of business.6'
Spec-Cast argued that under UCC section 3-401(1), the Bank
was liable for the $20,000 because it paid an unsigned instrument.62
The Bank contended that an action under section 3-401(1) did not
preclude it from raising common law defenses.63 Specifically, the
Bank argued that Spec-Cast received the benefit of its bargain
when Jackson accepted the promissory note from Lundquist be-
cause Jackson would not have received the note if Lundquist had
not received the check.64 Additionally, the Bank asserted that
Jackson ratified the Bank's payment on the unsigned check when
he accepted the interest payment on the note.65
The supreme court affirmed the lower courts' finding in favor of
55. Spec-Cast, 128 I11. 2d at 170-71, 538 N.E.2d at 543-44. The loan was to enable
Lundquist to purchase inventory for his business. Id. at 170, 538 N.E.2d at 543. Jackson
argued that he intended to leave the check unsigned until he received collateral. Id. at
178, 538 N.E.2d at 547. The trial court found, however, that Jackson had intended to
sign the check and that the omission was accidental. Id.
56. Id. at 170-71, 538 N.E.2d at 544. Testimony conflicted as to whether Jackson
would receive a security interest in the inventory that Lundquist purchased with the loan.
Id. at 171, 538 N.E.2d at 544.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. When Jackson noticed that the Bank had paid his unsigned check, he re-
quested his secretary to look into the matter. Id. The Bank's senior vice-president ad-
vised Jackson that nothing could be done and suggested that Jackson speak with
Lundquist. Id.
60. Id. at 171-72, 538 N.E.2d at 544. The May 1983 payment was the only interest
payment that Jackson ever received. Id. at 171, 538 N.E.2d at 544.
61. Id. at 172, 538 N.E.2d at 544. The assets of Richard's Auto Sales were used to
pay its other business creditors. Id. Lundquist listed the $20,000 as a personal debt in his
own bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
62. Id. See supra note 54 for the relevant statutory provision.
63. 128 Ill. 2d at 172, 538 N.E.2d at 544.
64. Id. at 177, 538 N.E.2d at 546.
65. Id. at 177, 538 N.E.2d at 546-47.
1990]
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the Bank.66 The court noted that the language of UCC section 1-
103 indicates that certain common law defenses may be raised
against actions under the Code. 67 Additionally, the court com-
mented that banks have raised common law defenses in other ac-
tions based on improper endorsements. 68  Further, the court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the present situation was
analogous to cases in which banks paid on forged endorsements.69
Ruling that the Bank was not liable under UCC section 3-
401(l),7° the court reasoned that the note stated "for value re-
ceived"; therefore it represented Jackson's benefit, for Jackson
would not have received the note if the Bank had not paid the
check. 71 Also, Jackson's actions in accepting an interest payment
66. Id. at 179, 538 N.E.2d at 547.
67. Id. at 173, 538 N.E.2d at 545. Section 1-103 of the UCC states: "[u]nless dis-
placed by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including
the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estop-
pel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 1-
103 (1987).
68. Spec-Cast, 128 Ill. 2d at 174, 538 N.E.2d at 545-46. The court analogized the
present case with two different situations in which common law defenses are raised by
banks that have paid improperly signed checks. Id. at 174-177, 538 N.E.2d at 545-46.
The first situation involves instruments that are not properly endorsed. See Malley v.
East Side Bank, 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1966) (defendant bank, which had cashed improp-
erly endorsed checks, argued that equity demands liability fall on the fraudulent third
party); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 24 111. App. 2d 275, 164
N.E.2d 497 (2nd Dist. 1960) (court recognized, but rejected bank's defense that plaintiff
made the second payee's name illegible and that plaintiff was negligent); Murray Walter,
Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 103 A.D.2d 466, 480 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1984) (bank argued
that because the plaintiff was negligent in notifying the bank, the plaintiff should be es-
topped from asserting liability).
The second situation involves checks that do not show all the necessary signatures. See
Madison Park Bank v. Field, 64 Ill. App. 3d 838, 381 N.E.2d 1030 (3rd Dist. 1978) (bank
paid a check with only one of two required signatures and argued that the plaintiff was
negligent for waiting too long to report the incident); Phillip v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Ill.
App. 498, 18 N.E.2d 57 (1st Dist. 1938) (court held that the plaintiff was grossly negli-
gent for failing to note that thirty-three checks had been cashed without a signature dur-
ing the prior three years).
69. Spec-Cast, 128 Ill. 2d at 176, 538 N.E.2d at 546. The court stated that "[in
Illinois, payment on a check missing a necessary signature does not constitute payment
on an 'unauthorized signature' within the meaning of section 4-406 of the Code." Id.
(relying on Nagle v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 472 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Il1. 1979) and Madison
Park Bank v. Field, 64 Ill. App. 3d 838, 381 N.E.2d 1030 (3rd Dist. 1978)).
70. Id. at 179, 538 N.E.2d at 547. The court concluded that the trial court's findings
were not manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 177, 538 N.E.2d at 547.
The court also determined that Lundquist's testimony that Jackson had forgotten to sign
the check did not coincide with his behavior the day after he delivered the check, when he
deposited $20,000 into his checking account. Id. at 177-78, 538 N.E.2d at 547.
71. Id. at 178, 538 N.E.2d at 547.
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on the note amounted to a ratification.72
The result in Spec-Cast stands apart in certain respects from the
other banking cases decided during the Survey year. Although the
court paid superficial deference to the unqualified language of UCC
section 3-401(1) and the duty it imposes upon the drawee bank to
pay checks, the court rejected per se liability for the breach of this
duty by permitting the Bank to raise common law defenses to the
breach. In particular, the court allowed the Bank to raise such
defenses even though the Bank had not followed its own proce-
dures for obtaining authorization to cash the unsigned check.73
Another significant aspect of the Spec-Cast decision is that the
court looked not only to Spec-Cast's knowledge of and acquies-
cence in the bank's payment of the unsigned check, but also to
Spec-Cast's relationship with Lundquist. 74 To relieve the bank of
liability, the court relied in part upon the drawer's relationship
with a third party, a relationship that has no direct bearing upon
the bank's knowledge and exercise of due care in processing the
check.
In light of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Spec-Cast,
drawers must take steps to detect improper payments as quickly as
possible and to affirmatively challenge such payments with compa-
rable speed. Although the drawer in Spec-Cast brought payment
of the unsigned check promptly to the bank's attention, he ulti-
mately took a "wait and see" approach with respect to the pay-
ment. In doing so, the drawer ratified the payment and precluded
his own recovery. 75
In National Commercial Banking Corp. v. Harris,76 the Illinois
Supreme Court held section 3 of the Foreign Office Banking Act
("the Illinois Act") 77 unconstitutional because it violated the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.7 s Section 3 of
the Illinois Act imposes a non-reciprocal license fee on foreign
72. Id.
73. The Bank's senior vice-president testified at trial that although it was a Bank
requirement to obtain authorization from the customer to process an unsigned check, the
bank had failed to obtain such authorization from Jackson. Id. at 171, 538 N.E.2d at
544.
74. See id. at 178, 538 N.E.2d at 547.
75. See Spec-Cast, 128 Ill. 2d at 178, 538 N.E.2d at 547, in which the court observed:
"Though Jackson did initially object to the payment of the check, his actions ultimately
were to accept its payment and to look to the payee."
76. 125 Ill. 2d 448, 532 N.E.2d 812 (1988).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2710 (1987). For a description of recent amend-
ments to the Illinois Act, see infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
78. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 467, 532 N.E.2d at 821. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
1990]
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banks whose licensing nation does not provide reciprocal licensing
authority to Illinois banks.79 Under the authority of the Interna-
tional Banking Act, s0 the United States Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (Comptroller) authorized three Australian banks to open
limited federal branches in Illinois.s" The Commissioner of Banks
and Trust Companies of the State of Illinois (Commissioner) de-
manded payment by each bank of the non-reciprocal license fee
imposed by section 3 of the Illinois Act.82 The banks refused to
pay the fee and brought an action against the Commissioner chal-
lenging his authority to collect the fee.83 The circuit court held the
Illinois Act unconstitutional, and the Commissioner appealed di-
rectly to the Illinois Supreme Court pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 302(a)(1).8
The banks argued that the non-reciprocal license fee violated the
federal Constitution's supremacy clause85 because the fee's imposi-
tion attempts to regulate licensing of a limited federal branch.86 As
such, the fee provision conflicted with section 5(a)(1) s7 of the Inter-
79. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 451, 532 N.E.2d at 813. The portion of section 3 of the Act
that was under review provides:
"A foreign banking corporation, upon receipt of a certificate of authority from
the Commissioner, may establish and maintain a single banking office in the
central business district of Chicago and may conduct thereat a general banking
business... [I]f a foreign banking corporation shall be licensed by any banking
supervisory authority of a jurisdiction other than the Commissioner, and the
foreign nation within which a foreign banking corporation so licensed does not
provide reciprocal licensing authority to Illinois State of [sic] National Banks,
then such foreign banking corporation shall pay an annual 'non-reciprocal' li-
cense fee to the State of Illinois which shall be deposited in the General Reve-
nue Fund. Such annual fee shall be in an amount of $50,000."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2710 (1987).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (1988).
81. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 451, 532 N.E.2d at 813. Each bank opened a limited federal
branch office in the downtown Chicago area. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 451-52, 532 N.E.2d at 813.
84. Id. at 451, 532 N.E.2d at 813. Rule 302(a)(1) provides: "Appeals from final
judgments of circuit courts shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court (1) in cases in
which a statute of the United States or of this State has been held invalid..." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 302(a)(1) (1987).
85. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
86. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 452, 532 N.E.2d at 813.
87. Section 5(a)(1) of the International Banking Act provides:
"(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, (1) no foreign bank
may directly or indirectly establish and operate a Federal branch outside of its
home State unless (A) its operation is expressly permitted by the State in which
it is to be operated, and (B) the foreign bank shall enter into an agreement or
undertaking with the Board to receive only such deposits at the place of opera-
tion of such Federal branch as would be permissible for a corporation organized
1990] Commercial Law
national Banking Act.88 The banks further contended that the fee
violated section 4(b) of the International Banking Act 8 9 and section
548 of the National Bank Act9° because it constituted a discrimina-
tory tax on foreign banks.91
The Commissioner argued that language in section 5(a)(1) of the
International Banking Act allows the State of Illinois to impose the
non-reciprocal license fee.92 The Commissioner conceded that sec-
tion 4(a) of the International Banking Act permits a state to pro-
hibit only the establishment of a branch or agency. 93 He argued,
however, that language in section 5(a), concerning limited federal
branches subjects a limited federal branch to State regulations that
could not be imposed on a federal branch or agency. 94 The Com-
missioner also urged the court to consider Illinois' regulatory inter-
ests in encouraging foreign countries to offer banking privileges to
Illinois or national banks.9"
The supreme court began its analysis by noting that the Comp-
troller had already published a rule stating that non-reciprocal li-
censing fees would be incompatible with the national approach
under section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act... under rules and regulations
administered by the Board."
12 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(1) (1988).
88. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 452, 532 N.E.2d at 813.
89. Section 4(b) of the International Banking Act provides in part:
"(b) In establishing and operating a Federal branch or agency, a foreign bank
shall be subject to such rules, regulations, and orders as the Comptroller consid-
ers appropriate to carry out this section, which shall include provisions for ser-
vice of process and maintenance of branch and agency accounts separate from
those of the parent bank. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chap-
ter or in rules, regulations, or orders adopted by the Comptroller under this
section, operations of a foreign bank at a Federal branch or agency shall be
conducted with the same rights and privileges as a national bank at the same
location and shall be subject to all the same duties, restrictions, penalties, liabili-
ties, conditions, and limitations that would apply under the National Bank Act
to a national bank doing business at the same location ......
12 U.S.C. § 3102(b) (1988).
90. Section 548 of the National Bank Act is applicable because the International
Banking Act grants federal branches or agencies the same rights and privileges accorded
to national banks and provides that "[rior the purposes of any tax law enacted under
authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank
organized and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its
principal office is located." 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
91. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 453, 532 N.E.2d at 814.
92. Id. The Commissioner relied on the following language contained in section
5(a)(l) of the International Banking Act: "its operation is expressly permitted by the
state." Id. See 12 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(1) (1988).
93. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 466, 532 N.E.2d at 820.
94. Id. at 453-54, 532 N.E.2d at 814.
95. Id. at 461, 532 N.E.2d at 818.
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taken by the International Banking Act.96 The court then looked
to the Congressional intent underlying the International Banking
Act's passage. 97 The court stated that Congress intended the Act
to give foreign banks the option to choose between a state charter
or a federal charter;98 Congress also intended the Act to replace the
state-by-state treatment of foreign banks with a cohesive national
system.99 The court explained that state statutes may have an inci-
dental or indirect effect on foreign nations, however, the non-recip-
rocal license fee fell "on the impermissible side of the line of
demarcation between incidental and unconstitutional intrusions
into foreign affairs."' 0 Because the Illinois Act's effect did not co-
incide with the full purposes and objectives of Congress, the court
held that the International Banking Act preempts section 3 of the
Illinois Foreign Office Banking Act.101
The court, in holding the Illinois Act unconstitutional, rejected
the Commissioner's argument that section 5(a)(1) of the Interna-
tional Banking Act allows states to regulate a limited federal
branch, but not a federal branch or agency. Instead, the court
found that Congress' intent clearly established a "national pos-
ture" toward all foreign-chartered banks operating under the fed-
eral system.10 2  The court determined that Illinois' license fee
constituted a tax or fine prohibited by both section 4(b) of the In-
ternational Banking Act and section 548 of the National Banking
Act. 103 A foreign-chartered bank operating under the federal sys-
tem cannot be taxed any differently than a State-chartered bank.°4
Because State banks are not subject to the non-reciprocal license
fee, neither are foreign banks, and collection of the fee was
96. Id. at 455, 532 N.E.2d at 815. The rule provides:
[I]n some States a foreign bank which applies for a branch or agency must be
able to demonstrate that the country under whose laws it was organized permits
free access to U.S. banks. Such a reciprocity approach would not be binding
upon the Comptroller's Office because it is incompatible with the national
theme of the IBA and, further, it is in the nature of a condition or limitation
rather than a prohibition on foreign entry.
44 Fed. Reg. 27,431 (1979).
97. Harris, 125 Ill. 2d at 459-60, 532 N.E.2d at 817.
98. Id. Under the International Banking Act, foreign banks would have the same
state-federal option as American banks. Id. at 460, 532 N.E.2d at 817.
99. Id. at 461, 532 N.E.2d at 818. The court explained that when states act in the
field of foreign affairs the end result is a lack of uniformity. Id. (relying on Springfield
Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 115 Ill. 2d 221, 503 N.E.2d 300 (1986)).
100. Id. at 462, 532 N.E.2d at 818.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 466, 532 N.E.2d at 820.
103. Id. at 466-67, 532 N.E.2d at 820.
104. Id. at 467, 532 N.E.2d at 820.
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unlawful.105
As a consequence of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Harris, the State faces somewhat of an all or nothing proposition
with respect to foreign banks.'° Harris has invalidated the State's
attempt to penalize such foreign banks by imposing a fee upon
them. Thus, Illinois must choose between exercising its option
under the International Banking Act and excluding foreign banks
altogether or accepting all such banks that wish to open offices in
Illinois, even if the countries from which these banks hail do not
permit Illinois banks to open branches within their borders.
III. CORPORATIONS
During this Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
an issue involving corporate shareholder derivative suits.107 Addi-
tionally, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District de-
cided a case utilizing the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.10 8
In Brown v. Tenney,'0 9 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
shareholder of record in a holding company may bring a double
derivative suit on behalf of a wholly owned subsidiary." 0 The
plaintiff, Brown, was a 48.5% shareholder and director of the hold-
ing company that owned all of the subsidiary's stock.' He filed a
complaint that alleged the defendants, shareholders in the holding
company, engaged in a pattern of self-dealing and breached their
fiduciary duties by abusing, manipulating, diverting and damaging
105. Id. at 467, 532 N.E.2d at 820-21.
106. Illinois' attempt to exclude those foreign banks licensed by nations that do not
provide reciprocal licensing authority to Illinois banks already has been invalidated. See
Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Heimann, No. 80-3284 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom., Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715
F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (the district court held that Illinois was precluded from requir-
ing that a foreign country extend reciprocity to Illinois state or national banks as a pre-
requisite to obtaining a certificate of authority to operate within Illinois).
107. See infra notes 109-130 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 131-142 and accompanying text.
109. 125 Ill. 2d 348, 532 N.E.2d 230 (1988).
110. Id. at 361, 532 N.E.2d at 235-36. In a double derivative suit, "a shareholder of a
parent or holding company seeks to enforce a right belonging to a subsidiary of the parent
or holding company." Id. at 352, 532 N.E.2d at 231. The suit can only be brought after
due demand is made to, and rejected by, the subsidiary and the holding company. Id. at
361, 532 N.E.2d at 235-36.
111. Id. at 353, 532 N.E.2d at 232. The plaintiff was originally the vice president and
chief operating officer of the subsidiary Pioneer Commodities, Inc. Id. In 1982, the
plaintiff and the other three shareholders formed a holding company for Pioneer and
exchanged their shares of Pioneer for an equal percentage of the holding company. Id.
Both Brown and Tenney were 48.5% shareholders in the holding company until 1983,
when Tenney obtained the proxies to vote for the remaining 3%. Id.
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the holding company's assets." 2 The trial court dismissed the
complaint; the appellate court reversed and the defendants
appealed. 113
In the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendants first argued that
the weight of authority did not support plaintiff's double derivative
suit." 4 The supreme court disagreed, finding that the concept of a
double derivative action has been widely accepted." I5 The defend-
ants further argued that the legislature did not explicitly provide
for a double derivative action; therefore, the court's recognition of
such an action would amount to judicial legislation. 116 The court
also rejected this argument, stating that its decision merely ex-
tended the principles of equity inherent in the shareholder-corpo-
ration context. '17 Corporate officers and directors are fiduciaries of
the corporation and its shareholders."18 The court explained that
when these fiduciaries fail to act in the interests of their benefi-
ciaries, such interests go completely unrepresented." 9 When the
directors of a parent corporation are also the directors of a subsidi-
ary, the lack of representation is even greater. '2° The court ex-
plained that because the subsidiary was controlled by the holding
corporation, which in turn was controlled by the alleged wrongdo-
ers, the subsidiary was not accountable to anyone.' 2 ' The holding
company, in this context, became a shield against liability.1 22
The court continued noting that the real owners of the subsidi-
ary were the holding company's shareholders, including the plain-
112. Id. at 354, 532 N.E.2d at 232.
113. Id. at 352, 532 N.E.2d at 231.
114. Id. at 357, 532 N.E.2d at 234.
115. Id. at 359, 532 N.E.2d at 234. See Kennedy v. Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157,
1162 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895, 900-901 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Kaufman v. Wolfson, 1 A.D.2d 555, 557, 151 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532-534 (1956); see also 2
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.40, at 761-62 (3d ed. Supp. 1987); PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02, at 48-49
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988) ("The more frequent and better practice has been to limit the
doctrine to situations where the shareholder's corporation holds at least a de facto con-
trolling interest in the injured corporation"). The cases cited by the defendants were
unpersuasive because they did not deal with a holding company-subsidiary relationship.
Brown, 125 Ill. 2d at 359, 532 N.E.2d at 234-35.
116. Id. at 360, 532 N.E.2d at 235.
117. Id.
118. Id. (relying on Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166
N.E.2d 793 (1960)).
119. Id. (relying on Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94, 109, 67
N.E.2d 265, 276 (1946)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 361, 532 N.E.2d at 235.
122. Id.
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tiff.' 23  Because both the subsidiary and the holding company
blocked the plaintiff, he had no other recourse but to resort to the
courts.1 24 According to the court, whether the shareholder's suit is
single, double or triple, the principles underlying a derivative suit
are still equitable in nature. 25 Furthermore, the court rejected the
defendant's policy reasons for condemning the double derivative
action. 26 The court was more concerned with not letting "defal-
cating, abusive and manipulative" directors and officers abuse their
fiduciary capacities by committing wrongs against a subsidiary. 21
As a result of the court's decision, a double derivative action now
may be maintained by a shareholder of a corporation, on behalf of
a wholly owned or dominated subsidiary, if due demand is made
to, and rejected by, the subsidiary and the holding company. 2 '
Brown represents a logical extension of the derivative suit in cir-
cumstances involving a complete identity of interests between a
holding corporation and the company whose stock it holds. In this
respect, the result is consistent with the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, and indeed, the court cites this doctrine to support
its holding. 29 It is not entirely clear how far the Brown rationale
may be extended beyond its facts to holding companies' sharehold-
ers who hold less than a total or majority interest in other corpora-
tions. Although the court did not expressly limit the double
derivative suit to circumstances of complete identity, there is con-
siderable language in the court's opinion limiting the right to bring
such a suit to circumstances in which the holding company owns
at least a controlling interest in the subsidiary. 'I
In Webb v. Webb,13 1 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District held an officer/principal shareholder of a corporation not
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 362, 532 N.E.2d at 236. The defendant argued that the court's recognition
of a double derivative suit would result in a "loss of corporate franchise tax revenue, a
dearth of directors' indemnity insurance, corporations besieged by requests for informa-
tion from all sources, and a flood of shareholder actions." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 361, 532 N.E.2d at 235-36.
129. Id. at 358, 532 N.E.2d at 234. The court states that "[i]t is a well-settled princi-
ple that the court will look behind and beneath the corporate veil to view the substance
and face of the corporate body, and that it will disregard corporate legal fictions when
used as a shield for wrongful acts." Id.
130. See, e.g., id. at 361, 532 N.E.2d at 236 ("plaintiff is entitled to bring a derivative
suit on behalf of the subsidiary company that the holding company, in which he is a
shareholder of record, controls") (emphasis added).
131. 180 Ill. App. 3d 619, 536 N.E.2d 206 (4th Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 134
(1989).
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liable for an unsatisfied worker's compensation award obtained
against the corporation. 132 The plaintiff, Richard Webb, obtained a
worker's compensation award against Macon County Speedway,
Inc. ("Speedway"). 33 Plaintiff alleged that the corporation had be-
come insolvent. 1 34 Consequently, the plaintiff brought suit against
Wayne Webb, Speedway's alleged "principal shareholder" and
"principal operating officer," for failing to obtain worker's com-
pensation insurance or to qualify as a self-insurer as required by
section 4 of the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). 35 The
circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for failing to state a cause of action.136
The plaintiff argued on appeal that defendant caused Speedway
to fail to meet the Act's requirements; therefore, the court should
pierce Speedway's corporate veil in order to hold the defendant
personally liable. 37 The plaintiff cited an Oregon case 38 for the
proposition that the corporate veil may be pierced if a plaintiff al-
leges and proves that the shareholder actually controlled the cor-
poration and that the shareholder's improper conduct caused the
plaintiff's inability to collect worker's compensation. 39
Nevertheless, the Webb court ruled that the plaintiff failed to
state a cause of action because the complaint did not allege that the
defendant was the corporation's alter ego corporation." The
court explained that in Illinois, the corporate entity will be disre-
garded only when it becomes an obstacle to private rights or when
it is the alter ego of the defendant's personality.' 4' In addition, the
132. Id. at 621, 536 N.E.2d at 207.
133. Id. at 620, 536 N.E.2d at 207.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 620-21, 536 N.E.2d at 207 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.4
(1987)). The plaintiff did not sue under section 19(g) of the Worker's Compensation Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.19(g) (1987) because Illinois courts have not allowed
judgments to be obtained against parties not named in the original action. Webb, 180 Ill.
App. 3d at 621, 536 N.E.2d at 207.
136. 180 111. App. 3d at 621, 536 N.E.2d at 207.
137. Id. The plaintiff recognized that no Illinois precedent existed to support holding
a corporation's officer or principal shareholder liable for a worker's compensation award
obtained against the corporation. Id.
138. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 294 Or. 94, 654 P.2d
1092 (1982) (en banc).
139. Webb, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 621, 536 N.E.2d at 207.
140. Id. at 622, 536 N.E.2d at 208.
141. Id. The court relied on Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 91111. App. 3d 999,
415 N.E.2d 560 (1st Dist. 1980), which enumerated the following factors that should be
considered when deciding to pierce the corporate veil: "(1) inadequate capitalization; (2)
failure to issue stock; (3) failure to observe corporate formalities; (4) nonpayment of divi-
dends; (5) insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time; (6) nonfunctioning of other
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court reasoned that any attempt to alter the scheme of the
Worker's Compensation Act should come from the legislature, not
the courts. 42
Webb honors the alter ego doctrine as applied to liability for
Worker's Compensation claims. The opinion represents a consid-
erable shield for principals of corporations that become financially
unable to honor Worker's Compensation claims and arguably, by
analogy, claims for other employment benefits. To the extent that
privately-sponsored benefits such as health care and retirement
pension plans have become increasingly important to individuals in
the work force, the appellate court's decision imposes an extremely
significant limitation upon the ability of employees to enforce their
rights to such benefits. Under Webb, an employee can recover
from the principal of an insolvent corporation only if the employee
can prove that the principal in question qualifies as the corpora-
tion's alter ego. The standard Webb rejected would have benefet-
ted employees by requiring only a showing that a principal
controlled a corporation and engaged in improper conduct that re-
sulted in an inability to make payment.
IV. CONTRACTS
The Illinois Supreme Court decided one significant case involv-
ing contracts during the Survey period. It invovled the assignment
of an express warranty. 43 The first district decided a case that in-
volved the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run on
an oral contract for a demand loan.""
In Collins Co., Ltd. v. Carboline Co.,' 4 5 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that because the valid assignment of an express war-
ranty places the assignee in contractual privity with the warrantor,
the express warranty extends to the assignee's right to sue for
purely economic loss and consequential damages.'46 Carboline
officers or directors; (7) absence of corporate records; and (8) whether in fact the corpora-
tion is only a mere facade for the operation of the dominant stockholders." Webb, 180
Ill. App. 3d at 622, 536 N.E.2d at 208.
142. Webb, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 623, 536 N.E.2d at 208. The court noted that other
states have found officers and directors liable for failing to insure their Worker's Compen-
sation liability. Id. at 622-23, 536 N.E.2d at 208. In those cases, however, the cause of
action was either a tort claim for the defendant's failure to provide compensation or a
statutory claim that provided for officer's or director's liability. Id.
143. See infra notes 145-170 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 171-180 and accompanying text.
145. 125 Ill. 2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834 (1988), later proceeding, 864 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.
1989).
146. Id. at 507-08, 352 N.E.2d at 837-38.
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Company ("Carboline") manufactured a roofing system for a ware-
house and guaranteed the roof for ten years in an express war-
ranty. 47 Four years later, Collins Company, Ltd. ("Collins")
acquired the building and when the roof began to leak, the original
owners assigned their rights under the warranty to Collins, in ex-
change for a covenant not to sue. 4 " Carboline refused to act under
the warranty, claiming that the warranty did not extend to Col-
lins. 149 Collins subsequently brought a diversity suit against Car-
boline for breach of warranty in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. 150
The district court concluded that Collins was not in privity with
Carboline and granted Carboline's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. 5 The case came before the Illinois Supreme Court on a
question of Illinois law certified by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit. 2 The certified question was "[i]n
the absence of original contractual privity, does an express war-
ranty extend to an assignee's right to sue for purely economic loss
and consequential damages?"'153
The supreme court held that an assignee of an express warranty
stands in privity with the warrantor so long as the actual assign-
ment is valid. 54 The court began its analysis by noting that "an
express warranty is a creature of contract" and it is "willed... into
being" by the warrantor.'55 Privity of contract is the relationship
that exists between contracting parties.'5 6 The court explained that
147. Id. at 502, 532 N.E.2d at 835. Although the warranty alleged to limit claims for
consequential damages, the court noted that the effect of any limiting clause in the war-
ranty was not an issue for decision. Id. at 502-03, 532 N.E.2d at 835.
148. Id. at 504, 532 N.E.2d at 836. Chicago Title and Trust, as trustee, and Wacho-
via Bank and Trust Company originally owned the warehouse. Id. at 501, 532 N.E.2d at
835.
149. Id. at 504-05, 532 N.E.2d at 836.
150. Id. at 504, 532 N.E.2d at 836.
151. Id. at 505, 532 N.E.2d at 836. Carboline raised four affirmative defenses and
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. First, Carboline argued that because
the warranty was unassignable, there never was an assignment to Collins. Id. Second,
Carboline argued that the warranty never was issued to Collins. Id. Third, Collins ar-
gued that the terms of the warranty limited any damages caused. Id. Finally, Carboline
argued that forces beyond Carboline's control caused the damage. Id.
152. Id. at 507, 532 N.E.2d at 837.
153. Id. at 501, 532 N.E.2d at 834.
154. Id. at 507-08, 532 N.E.2d at 837. Privity gives the assignee all the rights that the
assignor previously held. Id. at 508, 532 N.E.2d at 837. According to the majority of
courts that have addressed this issue, the court's holding is consistent with UCC section
2-210. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-210 (1987).
155. Collins, 125 Il. 2d at 509, 532 N.E.2d at 838.
156. Id. at 511, 532 N.E.2d at 839.
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when one party to a contract assigns his rights to the contract, the
assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor and stands in privity
with the other party to the contract.15 7 Thus, because an express
warranty is a creature of contract and privity accompanies the as-
signment of a contract, it follows that the assignee of an express
warranty stands in privity with the warrantor.15 8
The court noted that the assignability of express warranty rights
has been recognized explicitly in some states and implicitly as-
sumed and even upheld in Illinois. 59 Additionally, no term in the
warranty forbade assignment of rights or obligations by any
party. 160 Thus, the court found it "logical" to permit the assign-
ment of the rights under the warranty, as long as they did not fall
within one of the UCC's exceptions to assignability. 161
Although the Illinois Supreme Court previously had held, in
Szajna v. General Motors Corp.,162 that implied warranties did not
extend to nonprivity buyers of new automobiles, the court ruled
that Szajna was "in harmony" with the Collins decision. 63 The
court explained that "there is a qualitative difference between the
157. Id. at 512, 532 N.E.2d at 839. The court noted that the UCC encourages free
assignability of contract rights and has only four exceptions. Id. at 512, 532 N.E.2d at
840. Section 2-210(2) of the UCC provides:
[u]nless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can be assigned
except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other
party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract,
or impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance. A right to
damages for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of the assignor's
due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement
otherwise.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-210(2) (1987).
158. Collins, 125 Ill. 2d at 512, 532 N.E.2d at 840.
159. Id. at 513-16, 532 N.E.2d at 840-41. The assignability of a warrantee's rights
has been recognized explicitly in Indiana and Minnesota and implicitly in California,
Florida, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 513-14, 532 N.E.2d at 840. The court cited to three
Illinois cases for support. Id. at 514-15, 532 N.E.2d at 841. See Morrow v. L.A. Gold-
schmidt Assocs., Inc., 112 Ill. 2d 87, 492 N.E.2d 181 (1986) (one express-warranty plain-
tiff was an original purchaser's assignee, though warranty assignment was not at issue);
Dillman & Assocs., Inc. v. Capitol Leasing Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 335, 442 N.E.2d 311
(4th Dist. 1982) (assignment of rights for breach of warranties was contemplated by
lease); People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects & Planners, Inc., 58 Ill. App.
3d 28, 373 N.E.2d 772 (4th Dist. 1978) aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 78 Ill. 2d
381, 400 N.E.2d 918 (1980) (assignment to lessee of all lessor's rights in guarantees and
warranties was an effective assignment of lessor's right to sue for breach of contract).
160. Collins, 125 Ill. 2d at 504, 532 N.E.2d at 836.
161. Id. at 515, 532 N.E.2d at 841. See supra note 157 (UCC exceptions). The court
recognized that whether the assignment violated one of the UCC's exceptions would be
for the federal court to decide. 125 Ill. 2d at 518, 532 N.E.2d at 842.
162. 115 Ill. 2d 294, 503 N.E.2d 760 (1986).
163. Collins, 125 Ill. 2d at 515, 532 N.E.2d at 841.
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burden of implied warranties, which are imposed by law, and the
nature of express warranties [such as here] freely given by warran-
tors and purporting to promise future performance for a stated
number of years." ''
The Collins court held that a valid assignment creates contrac-
tual privity, but the decision leaves unanswered whether a subse-
quent property owner may, in the absence of contractual privity, 65
enforce a warranty made to the original property owner.1 66 This
question is particularly important against the backdrop of the line
of Illinois cases beginning with the Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National
Tank Co., 167 which held that an injured party cannot sue in tort for
purely economic losses. Collins opens the door part way to such
recovery through its holding that express warranties may be as-
signed when the warrantor has not specifically prohibited or re-
stricted assignment. 6  Although the court acknowledged that
prior Illinois case law169 precludes subsequent nonprivity owners
from recovering under implied warranties, the court expressly
noted that there may be room in the future for the extension of
"some warranties" to nonprivity buyers in "appropriate circum-
stances."1 70 Thus, although the court expressly left open questions
as to nonprivity buyers' ability to enforce express warranties, the
enforceability of express limitations on warranties and the applica-
bility of the exceptions to assignability set forth in UCC section 2-
210(2), the court's rationale suggests that in future cases it may
retreat from the bright lines it drew against recovery in cases such
as Moorman and Szajna.
In light of Collins, purchasers of property should obtain assign-
164. Id. at 516, 532 N.E.2d at 841-42. The court did not address whether the assign-
ment to Collins was valid, but it did note circumstances surrounding the assignment that
might bear on its validity. For example, Collins alleged that it had relied upon the ex-
press warranty in purchasing the property in question; the assignment, however, did not
take place until two years after the sale to Collins and after the leakage occurred. Id. at
504, 532 N.E.2d at 836. Furthermore, Chicago Title, the original owner, assigned the
warranty at that time in exchange for a covenant not to sue. Id. Thus, it is at least
arguable that Collins had not in fact relied upon the warranty in purchasing the property,
and it obtained the assignment after the damage incurred simply in an attempt to circum-
vent the bar against recovery in tort for its economic losses. Id. at 505, 532 N.E.2d at
836.
165. Thus, in the court's analysis, either no assignment was made or the assignment
was invalid.
166. 125 111. 2d at 507, 532 N.E.2d at 837.
167. 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982)
168. Collins, 125 Ill. 2d at 515, 532 N.E.2d at 841.
169. See, e.g., Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 294, 503 N.E.2d 760
(1986).
170. Collins, 125 Ill. 2d at 516, 532 N.E.2d at 842.
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ments of express warranties to protect themselves against future
economic losses. Although the Collins court did not address the
assignment's validity, prudence would dictate that the purchaser
obtain the assignment as part of the bargain to buy the property.
In contrast, sellers who wish to protect themselves against future
litigation should incorporate language strictly limiting assignability
in express warranties made to buyers.
In a case involving the statute of limitations in an oral contract
for a demand loan, Schreiber v. Hackett,'7' the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District decided that the statute does not begin
to run until an actual demand has been made. 172 The case arose
when two commodities brokers entered into a contract on Septem-
ber 22, 1980 whereby the plaintiff loaned the defendant $2500 in
exchange for the defendant's oral promise to repay the loan on de-
mand. 73 On October 10, 1985, the plaintiff made a demand for
repayment of the loan and the defendant refused to pay. 74
On a motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the statute of
limitations began to run on the day plaintiff made the loan. 75
Thus, because the plaintiff filed his action on February 27, 1986,
more than five years after the date of the original transaction, the
trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 76 The plain-
tiff appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations started to run
when he first demanded repayment, on October 10, 1985.177
The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling and held
that the statute of limitations began to run when, upon plaintiff's
demand, the defendant refused repayment. ' 7  The court asserted
that a promise to repay on demand "is an express condition prece-
dent to the duty of performance."'' 79 Thus, the plaintiff did not
have an action until demand was made and refused on October 10,
1985, only four months before he brought his suit.8 0
Schreiber demonstrates the importance of imposing a reasonable
outer time limit on loans payable upon demand. The result in
171. 173 Ill. App. 3d 129, 527 N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist. 1988).
172. Id. at 131-32, 527 N.E.2d at 413.
173. Id. at 130, 527 N.E.2d at 412.
174. Id.
175. Id. The statute of limitations provides in pertinent part that "actions on unwrit-
ten contracts, express or implied, . . . shall be commenced within 5 years next after the
cause of action accrued." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-205 (1987).
176. Schreiber, 173 I11. App. 3d at 130, 527 N.E.2d at 412-13.
177. Id. at 130-31, 527 N.E.2d at 412-13.
178. Id. at 131, 527 N.E.2d at 413.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 131-32, 527 N.E.2d at 413.
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Schreiber, however, is unremarkable. The conclusion for which
the defendant argued, that the statute of limitations began to run
when the loan was made, necessarily relies upon the premise that
defendant breached the loan agreement the moment it was made.
Such a premise is plainly untenable in the absence of a demand for
repayment.
V. LEGISLATION
A. Banks and Banking Legislation
An amendment to paragraph 321, section 14 of the Illinois
Banking Act now permits a state bank to acquire or resell its own
shares of treasury stock without a change in the bank's charter.1
8 1
The treasury stock may be held for any purpose that unissued
shares of capital stock may be held for, under subsection (5) of
section 14.182 The stock may be resold under reasonable terms de-
termined by the bank's board of directors so long as the Commis-
sioner is given notice by the board prior to the resale of the
stock.1 3 In addition, the Illinois Banking Act was amended to au-
thorize a bank to disclose the financial records of a customer when
the bank is attempting to collect an obligation owed to the bank
and the bank complies with the provisions of section 21 of the Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.
8 4
Section 6 of the Foreign Banking Office Act was amended to
authorize foreign banks to establish and maintain banking offices
outside Chicago's central business district under certain condi-
tions. 18 5 The office must be located in a building that the World
Trade Centers Association and the Illinois Export Council desig-
nate as a World Trade Center and that is within the corporate
boundaries of the City of Chicago. 186 The offices may only conduct
activities that are incidental to international or foreign business as
determined by regulations the Commissioner promulgates.8 7
B. Securities Legislation
The legislature also amended the Illinois Securities Law of
181. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 321 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 360 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989). See The Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121.5, para.
2621 (1987).
185. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2713 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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1953 '18 and made several important substantive changes."9
Amendments to section 3 liberalized the exemptions from securi-
ties registration for entities that do not require special investor pro-
tection.190 Section 8 was amended to add new consumer protection
pertaining to the registration of dealers, salespersons, and invest-
ment advisers.1 9' Finally, section 11 was amended to increase the
Secretary of State's enforcement powers. 192
VI. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, the courts addressed many issues in the
field of commercial law. The holding in Spec-Cast, which allows
banks to raise common law defenses in defense of a UCC section 3-
401(1) claim, should prove to be a valuable tool for banks. Fur-
thermore, shareholders scored a victory in Brown which extended
their right as shareholders of a parent corporation to sue deriva-
tively on behalf of a holding company "controlled" by the parent
corporation. Finally, the court's use of black letter contract law in
Collins has cleared up any confusion surrounding the valid assign-
ment of an express warranty.
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121.5, para. 137.1 -.19 (1987).
189. For a detailed discussion all the 1988 amendments to the Illinois Securities Law
of 1953, see Fein and Sosin, 1988 Amendments to the Illinois Securities Law, 3 CHI. B. A.
REc. 3 (spec. supp. 1989).
190. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121.5, para. 137.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
191. Id. para. 137.8.
192. Id. para. 137.11.
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